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INTRODUCTION 
In Delhi, under British rule, the government provided a bounty on 
dead cobras in an attempt to reduce the population of the deadly snake. 
Eventually, some people employing the motto of “work smarter, not 
harder,” began breeding cobras for the bounty, leading to an increase in 
the cobra population when the cobras inevitably escaped. History is replete 
with examples of these well-intentioned laws that either exacerbated the 
existing problem or created even larger auxiliary issues. Such instances 
have become known as “the cobra effect”;1 other examples come from the 
French “rat-tail” bounty of Hanoi2 and essentially every animal 
importation decision that concerned the colonization of Australia.3 To this 
infamous list can be added the inter partes review proceeding recently 
developed in the American patent system: by trying to limit the amount of 
meritless patent infringement suits, the system has increased the number 
of meritless administrative inter partes review challenges to patents. 
The patent system in the United States was forever changed with the 
introduction of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA) in September 
of 2011. The AIA brought sweeping changes to American patent law in 
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 1. See generally HORST SIEBERT, DER KOBRA-EFFEKT (2002). 
 2. See Michael G. Vann, Of Rats, Rice, and Race: The Great Hanoi Rat Massacre, an Episode 
in French Colonial History, in 4 FRENCH COLONIAL HISTORY 191, 191–93 (2003). A law in French-
ruled Hanoi aimed to decrease the rampant rat population. In order to collect the bounty, one needed 
to provide the government with a rat tail as proof. Unfortunately, humans rarely do more than the bare 
minimum, and eventually many tailless rats were roaming the streets, doing little to stem the 
population. Id. 
 3. See generally Feral Animals in Australia, AUSTL. GOV’T DEP’T ENV’T & ENERGY, 
http://www.environment.gov.au/biodiversity/invasive-species/feral-animals-australia [https://perma. 
cc/L9VU-WQNJ]. Especially prominent was the introduction of the cane toad, which was initially 
introduced to combat beetles but has caused millions of dollars’ worth of damage to the Australian 
ecosystem. Id. 
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order to align the U.S. with much of the rest of the world by changing the 
invention priority from a “first to invent” to a “first to file” system. Among 
the many other changes included in the AIA, two of particular import to 
this Note are the inter partes review and the transitory covered business 
method patent review. 
Understanding this Note will necessitate having knowledge of 
multiple patent review procedures, which I postulate can be combined to 
create a workable solution for the current issues that have arisen with inter 
partes reviews. Therefore, in the first section I will provide a brief 
overview of the substance of inter partes reviews and some of the most 
critical negatives that have become apparent since 2013. I will also give a 
brief look at the similarities and key differences between inter partes 
reviews and the covered business method patent reviews, and the 
advantages they give to certain classes of patents. The section will 
conclude by looking at the European equivalent procedure of inter partes 
reviews, known as oppositions. 
The second section of this Note will highlight the imperfections and 
abuses that have become apparent with the inter partes review process, 
especially in how the biotechnology and biopharmaceutical industries4 
have been negatively impacted or threatened. Next, I will give reasons why 
the biotechnology and biopharmaceutical industries need to have further 
protections from inter partes review abuses to continue providing 
technologies that help make the world a better place. 
This Note will then conclude with proposed amendments to the inter 
partes review procedure, combining elements of covered business method 
reviews and oppositions that could be used to ease the burden on the 
biotech industry, to provide a better system for ensuring that developers of 
drugs can spend more time in the laboratory and less time in the court 
room. This system should help correctly incentivize companies to continue 
spending the incredible amount of capital required to bring a drug to 
market with proper patent protections intact, but it would further the goal 
of inter partes reviews in providing an efficient way of invalidating 
meritless patents.   
I. POST-ISSUANCE CHALLENGES TO PATENTS 
The original intent in creating post-issuance reviews in the AIA5 was 
to reduce the cost and timeline of litigating challenges to patents in the 
                                                     
 4. Throughout this Note, for ease of reading and because there is a significant amount of overlap 
between the industries, I will be using the term “biotech” to cover the biotechnology, 
biopharmaceutical, and pharmaceutical industries. 
 5. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). 
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courtroom.6 While still a lengthy and costly process, inter partes reviews 
do fulfill that purpose by drastically reducing the timeline of the 
proceedings. Another intention was to decrease the amount of frivolous 
lawsuits brought by “patent trolls.”7 Patent trolls are hard to uniformly 
define, but are largely viewed as non-practicing entities (NPE), or patent-
asserting entities,8 that purchase patents—not to profit from making a 
product—but as a business strategy to then sue manufacturers for 
infringing on those patents.9 
In order to develop a better system for efficiently challenging any 
administrative post-issuance challenge, it is necessary to have a better 
understanding of the way things currently stand. While there are many 
procedures that may be performed to challenge a patent after it has been 
issued, the three at issue for this Note are (1) Inter Partes Review (IPR),10 
(2) the related Covered Business Method (CBM) patent reviews,11 and (3) 
oppositions.12 The first two come from the AIA, whereas oppositions have 
been in effect with the European Patent Office long before the AIA took 
effect. Of the other two post-grant proceedings under the AIA, post-grant 
reviews are seldom utilized due to time constraints,13 and ex parte 
reexaminations are almost exclusively used by the patentee, or patent 
holder, to either broaden or limit the scope of the patent.14 
A. Inter Partes Reviews 
IPRs and CBMs are relatively recent proceedings, having been 
introduced in the AIA in 2011 and going into effect in 2013 with the intent 
of providing a quick, cost-effective way to invalidate meritless patents. 
                                                     
 6. See generally id. 
 7. Gene Quinn, Patent Abuse or Genius? Is Kyle Bass Abusing the Patent System?, 
IPWATCHDOG (Apr. 8, 2015), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/04/08/is-kyle-bass-abusing-the-
patent-system/id=56613/ [https://perma.cc/2C9C-7E3X]. 
 8. Although NPEs often get a negative reputation, there are many nonmalicious reasons to assert 
a patent that a party does not own. For example, if a party gains a patent through a bankruptcy and has 
neither the expertise nor the resources to practice the technology, it is often forced to pursue actions 
in order to keep from being estopped from asserting the rights later. 
 9. Gene Quinn, In Search of a Definition of the Term “Patent Troll,” IPWATCHDOG (July 18, 
2010), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2010/07/18/definition-patent-troll/id=11700/ [https://perma.cc/ 
2BCB-HX4Q]. 
 10. 35 U.S.C. § 311 (2012 & Supp. I 2013). 
 11. 37 C.F.R. § 42.300 (2018). 
 12. Convention on the Grant of European Patents art. 99, Oct. 5 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 199 (as 
amended Nov. 29, 2000). 
 13. PGRs must be filed within nine months of a patent being granted. 35 U.S.C. § 321(b) (2012). 
Although this is the same time frame as oppositions, unsuccessful PGR proceedings carry wide 
estoppel provisions and are therefore risky to bring without extensive review of the prior art. 
 14. Scott McKeown, Is There Value to Ex Parte Patent Reexamination After the AIA?, PATENTS 
POST GRANT (Feb. 14, 2013), http://www.patentspostgrant.com/is-there-value-in-ex-parte-patent-
reexamination-after-the-aia [https://perma.cc/NQ9R-TXA9]. 
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Recently, IPRs, and to a lesser extent post-grant reviews,15 have come 
under intense scrutiny because of their ability to invalidate patents without 
requiring a full trial or patent examiner review.16 Instead, these reviews 
are judged by a panel of three members from the Patent Trial and Appeals 
Board (PTAB).17 To understand the controversy surrounding these 
procedures, there must first be an understanding of how such procedures 
operate and what advantages and disadvantages are faced by patentees and 
third parties. 
Because it was introduced with the AIA, IPRs may only be initiated 
on patents that have effective filing dates on or after March 16, 2013.18 
IPRs may be instituted by any third party looking to invalidate any number 
of claims disclosed in the patent and may be filed any time between nine 
months after the patent has been issued and its expiration.19 The subject 
matter that may be challenged with an IPR is limited in scope, and only 
issues concerning novelty20 and obviousness21 may be considered.22 The 
evidence used to challenge a claim with an IPR is also limited, with only 
earlier patents and publications allowed; the on-sale bar23 and 
patentability24 issues are not applicable in IPR hearings. Because IPRs are 
an expedited proceeding, the process may only take up to eighteen months 
to proceed.25 Once a petition for an IPR has been filed, the patentee may 
file a response as to why the petition should be denied.26 Additionally, the 
patentee also has the one-time opportunity to amend or remove the 
challenged claims, or substitute new claims to replace the challenged 
claims.27 
Once an IPR has been requested, the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO) must grant such request if it is “more likely 
than not that a claim is unpatentable or if the IPR raises any novel legal 
questions.”28 The proceeding goes before the PTAB and runs much like 
                                                     
 15. 35 U.S.C. § 321 (2012). 
 16. Matt Levy, Three Crucial Words in Patent Reform: Inter Partes Review, PAT. PROGRESS, 
http://www.patentprogress.org/2015/05/14/three-crucial-words-in-patent-reform-inter-partes-review-
part-1/ [https://perma.cc/W4UJ-EBSN]. 
 17. Id. 
 18. MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL., PATENT LAW 627 (4th ed. 2015). 
 19. Id. 
 20. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012 & Supp. IV 2016). 
 21. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012). 
 22. Id. § 311(b). 
 23. Essentially, if a patented object has been sold for more than a year before the filing of a 
patent, it may not be patented. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (2012 & Supp. IV 2016). 
 24. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 25. Id. 
 26. ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 18, at 628. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
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any other litigation with motions, discovery, and eventually a “trial.”29 At 
the end of such trial, the PTAB either certifies that the claims, original or 
amended, are valid or invalidates the challenged claims.30 Any decisions 
by the PTAB are appealable to the district court, assuming the party has 
standing.31 
There are risks to a challenger in petitioning for IPRs if the claim is 
eventually found to be valid, however. If the PTAB declares claims to be 
valid, the petitioner and its privies forever lose the ability to not only raise 
the same issues again but also the ability to raise any issues that 
“reasonably could be raised.”32 While this is a great boon to patentees, 
much controversy exists over the procedural differences between arguing 
the validity of a patent in front of the PTAB and the more traditional route 
of defending patents in federal court,33 with the greatest of these 
controversies being centered on the standard of proof for invalidity.34 
B. Covered Business Method Patent Review 
The transitory program for covered business method patent reviews 
is a special type of subset of post-grant reviews that covers, not 
surprisingly, business method patents. As the name implies, the process is 
not intended to be in effect permanently and will sunset in 2020.35 
Business method patent reviews are a special proceeding carved out in 
response to perceived abuses of business method patents.36 In particular, 
the federal circuit has limited covered business method patents to “a patent 
that claims a method or corresponding apparatus for performing data 
processing or other operations used in the practice, administration, or 
management of a financial product or service, except that the term does 
not include patents for technological inventions.”37 Whether a patent is for 
                                                     
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Levy, supra note 16. 
 32. 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(1)–(2) (2012). 
 33. A Closer Look at the PTAB’s New Post-Issuance Review Procedures, INTELL. ASSET MGMT., 
Mar.–Apr. 2016, at 44, https://www.finnegan.com/images/content/9/1/v3/910/ACloserLookatthe 
PTABsNewPostIssuanceReviewProcedures.pdf [https://perma.cc/TG9C-9CRA]. 
 34. In IPRs, invalidity need only be shown by a preponderance of evidence. 35 U.S.C. § 316(e) 
(2012). At trial, invalidity must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. Microsoft v. i4i Ltd. 
P’ship, 564 U.S. 91 (2011). 
 35. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 18(a)(3)(A), 125 Stat. 284, 330 
(2011). 
 36. Joshua Zarabi, Covered Business Method–Is There a Limit to What Is “Covered”?, CARTER 
DELUCA FARRELL & SCHMIDT LLP (Oct. 23, 2015), http://www.cdfslaw.com/publications/covered-
business-method-limit-covered-2/ [https://perma.cc/KB6H-DR5P]. 
 37. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 18(d)(1), 125 Stat. 284, 329; see also Versata Dev. Grp. 
v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (noting that a technological patent is one in 
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a technological invention or a business method is determined on a case-
by-case basis.38 
CBMs have slightly different qualifications than IPRs for who may 
bring an action and what may be used to attempt to invalidate a claim. In 
order to initiate a CBM proceeding, a plaintiff must be someone who has 
been either sued or charged with infringement of a CBM patent.39 
Compare this to IPRs, where any third party can initiate a proceeding. The 
prior art that is allowed to challenge a CBM is also slightly narrower than 
IPRs, limiting any § 102 art to § 102(a).40 Challenges may still be 
maintained using patents or printed publications or § 101.41 
The trade-off for having a more stringent standing requirement 
compared to IPRs is the lesser extent that a petitioner is estopped after an 
unsuccessful CBM proceeding. Parties who unsuccessfully challenge a 
business method are only estopped from raising the same issue in the 
future but are free to challenge based on different issues in a future 
proceeding.42 
C. Oppositions 
Oppositions are procedures in the European Patent Office (EPO) that 
are very similar to inter partes reviews. The two main procedural 
differences are in the timeline the procedure is available and in the party 
allowed to initiate the opposition. The window to initiate an opposition is 
a scant nine months after a patent has issued, similar to post-grant 
reviews,43 but far narrower than the years available for IPRs.44 
The other key difference is who may initiate an opposition. Unlike 
the United States, a party may remain anonymous in bringing an 
opposition in the European Union.45 Comparatively, an initiation of an IPR 
must state the real parties in interest.46 
                                                     
which “the claimed subject matter as a whole recites a technological feature that is novel and 
unobvious over the prior art; and solves a technical problem using a technical solution”). 
 38. 37 C.F.R. § 42.301(b) (2018). 
 39. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 18(a)(1)(B). 
 40. Id. § 18(a)(1)(C)(ii). 
 41. Id. § 18(a)(1)(C). 
 42. Id. § 18(a)(1)(D). 
 43. 35 U.S.C. § 321 (2012). 
 44. Michael J. Flibbert et al., Coordinating European and U.S. Post-Grant Patent Opposition, 
FINNEGAN (Nov. 4, 2014), https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/coordinating-european-and-u-s-
post-grant-patent-opposition.html [https://perma.cc/4B6E-4T29]. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
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II. WHY BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENTS ARE VULNERABLE TO 
CHALLENGE UNDER INTER PARTES REVIEW 
Recently, pharmaceutical companies have been facing a large 
number of difficulties, even beyond problems from IPRs. The ongoing 
pharmaceutical “patent cliff”47 is estimated to cost the industry over $200 
billion worth of patent expiration.48 Recent controversies have arisen from 
the pricing of medical devices and drugs.49 Disputes involving health care 
and the coverage of very expensive drugs have made headlines.50 In short, 
public perception of pharmaceutical companies has seldom—if ever—
been lower than it is today. And yet, the public needs biotech companies 
to continue to cure diseases and solve the world’s problems, and the 
outstanding cost of discovering drugs must be covered by a relatively high 
price of such drugs. 
The greatest enemy facing biotechnology companies, however, is the 
IPR. Biotech companies are acutely vulnerable to patent challenges, and 
inter partes review in particular, because (1) biotech patents have limited 
ways of extracting value from innovations without patent protection; (2) 
massive regulatory oversight in biotech products slows innovation; (3) 
fewer patents in biotechnology expose companies to substantial risk if one 
of them is blocked; and (4) the expense and risk of developing patentable 
pharmaceutical products is substantial. This vulnerability comes at a great 
risk: the public relies on lifesaving developments from the biotechnology 
industry. 
A. Biotech Patents Are Limited in Ways to Make a Profit 
Biotech patents can be readily differentiated from many other types 
of high-tech products like computer software, robotics, and computer 
technologies in a few key ways. Unlike software and many electronic 
                                                     
 47. “A ‘patent cliff’ occurs when a relatively large number of blockbuster prescription drugs lose 
their patent protection within the same year.” 2016: A ‘Mini-Cliff’ for Drug Patents, 
UNITEDHEALTHCARE (June 9, 2016), https://consultant.uhc.com/articleView-16864 [https://perma. 
cc/7RNW-UABB]. 
 48. Angela Sands, Top 10 Patent Losses to Watch out for, TOTAL BIOPHARMA, http://www. 
totalbiopharma.com/2014/06/06/top-10-patent-losses-watch/ [https://perma.cc/R3AW-4Q5V]. 
 49. See, e.g., Christie Smythe & Keri Geiger, Shkreli, Drug Price Gouger, Denies Fraud and 
Posts Bail, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 17, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/features/2015-martin-shkreli-
securities-fraud/ [https://perma.cc/Y4M4-QTNZ] (detailing the public outcry concerning the CEO 
who raised the price of an AIDS drug over 5,000%); Brad Tuttle, Why the EpiPen Price Scandal Sums 
up Everything We Hate About Big Business & Politics, TIME: MONEY (Sept. 21, 2016), 
http://time.com/money/4502891/epipen-pricing-scandal-big-pharma-politics/ [https://perma.cc/ 
A25V-UN9F] (describing the outrage involved in the sudden increase in the EpiPen price). 
 50. See Jake Harper, States Deny Pricey Hepatitis C Drugs to Most Medicaid Patients, NPR 
(Dec. 27, 2015), http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2015/12/27/460086615/states-deny-pricey-
hepatitis-c-drugs-to-most-medicaid-patients. 
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patents, there are few ways for a pharmaceutical company to recoup the 
capital spent in developing a product without the monopoly protection of 
a patent. 51 Many drugs are relatively easy to reverse engineer,52 so there 
is little possibility of keeping them protected by trade secrets. In addition, 
since few people ever become truly brand loyal to drug companies when 
it affects their wallets, being first to market provides little advantage 
against generics and biosimilars. 53 
B. Government Oversight Stifles Biotech Innovation 
Biotech patents also differ from other high-tech patents in the sheer 
amount of governmental regulation involved. For example, in order to 
introduce a drug to market, a drug must pass through a lengthy three-step 
process of clinical trials with the FDA. After years spent developing a 
promising candidate, the clinical trials take, on average, eight to twelve 
years.54 There is little that can be done to shortcut this process without 
sacrificing patient safety. The public good is served best when the drugs 
that are sold have been found to be safe or at least acceptably dangerous 
compared to the alternative of withholding treatment. However, this 
means that there should be a presumption of usefulness and necessity for 
any drug that eventually gets to market; no rational developer would risk 
the time and money on a product that has no value to the public. 
C. The Small Number of Biotech Patents Exposes Companies to 
Risk If Patents Are Challenged 
Another reason biotech companies are particularly susceptible to 
patent challenges is the relatively small number of patents a single 
company will rely on. Unlike software or hardware companies, most 
innovative biotech companies operate with a very small patent portfolio.55 
While the large companies still carry a significant portfolio, the identity of 
                                                     
 51. See generally Himanshu Gupta et al., Patent Protection Strategies, J. PHARMACY & 
BIOALLIED SCI., Jan.–Mar. 2012, at 2. 
 52. See Esteban Burrone, Patents at the Core: The Biotech Business, WORLD INTELL. PROP. 
ORG. (2006), http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/documents/patents_biotech_fulltext.html#P25_4185 
[https://perma.cc/KJ6L-P8ZC]. 
 53. Denise Myshko, The Rise of Biosimilars, PHARMAVOICE (Sept. 2014), http://www. 
pharmavoice.com/article/biosimilars/ [https://perma.cc/28JF-7V9Z]. 
 54. See generally Martin S. Lipsky & Lisa K. Sharp, From Idea to Market: The Drug Approval 
Process, 14 J. AM. BOARD FAM. PRAC. 362 (2001). 
 55. The Impact of Abusive Patent Litigation Practices on the American Economy: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on Judiciary, 114th Cong. 1–2 (2015) [hereinafter Sauer Testimony] (testimony 
of Hans Sauer, Ph.D., Deputy Gen. Counsel for Intellectual Property, Biotechnology Industry 
Association), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/the-impact-of-abusive-patent-litigation-
practices-on-the-american-economy. 
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who is actually innovating and discovering new drugs has changed 
significantly in the past few years.56 
A significant change in the biotech and pharmaceutical world is who 
is coming up with new drugs and how those drugs are being marketed. 
Recently, there has been drastically less innovation from large companies, 
such as Roche and Pfizer, and much more innovation from small biotech 
startups.57 In 2015, over sixty percent of new approved drugs came from 
small biotech firms.58 
Part of the reason less innovation is coming from large corporations 
is the amount of overhead involved in running bulky, bureaucratic 
entities.59 Small companies have the luxury of devoting their complete 
time and attention to developing useful products, while large companies 
must deal with management, overhead, and feuding departments.60 One 
study found that in larger corporations, most research and development 
(R&D) employees will put personal and departmental priorities over team 
and innovation goals.61 This amount of bureaucratic headache leads to the 
formation of many small biotech companies as top scientists leave 
management to return to the laboratory. 
While smaller companies can allow innovative scientists more 
freedom to concentrate on developing drugs, they are also highly 
susceptible to any threats to their patents and income streams. These 
companies have no “blockbuster drugs”62 to carry them financially while 
fighting any patent challenges, and they often rely solely on investment 
from venture capitalists.63 Challenges to such patents can lead to the death 
of a company because the cost to defend against such claims can total 
upwards of $1 million.64 The lifecycle and goal of small companies is to 
innovate, patent, and either make all of their money through licensing their 
                                                     
 56. Jennifer Alsever, Big Pharma Innovation in Small Places, FORTUNE (May 13, 2016), 
http://fortune.com/2016/05/13/big-pharma-biotech-startups/ [https://perma.cc/KF8U-9FMS]. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Peter Tollman et al., Can R&D Be Fixed?: Lessons from Biopharma Outliers, BOS. 
CONSULTING GROUP (Sept. 6, 2011), https://www.bcg.com/publications/2011/biopharmaceuticals-
innovation-can-r-and-d-be-fixed.aspx [https://perma.cc/HZ52-VFHD]. 
 62. Defined as a drug “where annual global turnover for that medicine exceeds US$ 1 billion.” 
Preliminary Report of the Directorate-General for Competition on the Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry, 
at 7 (Nov. 28, 2008), http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/preliminary_ 
report.pdf [https://perma.cc/E6FK-VWW2]. 
 63. Alsever, supra note 56. 
 64. Gene Quinn, BIO, PhRMA Lobby for IPR Fix to Insulate Their Patents from Challenge, 
IPWATCHDOG (July 26, 2015), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/07/26/bio-phrma-lobby-for-ipr-
fix/id=59965/ [https://perma.cc/8FSL-YVLQ]. 
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technology65 or being swallowed up by larger companies with the 
manufacturing capability to capitalize the technology.66 
D. Expense in Researching and Developing a New Drug 
A fourth reason biotech products are so sensitive to patent challenges 
is the expense and risk involved in developing a new drug. The average 
cost of developing a new drug and getting it to market is a staggering $2 
billion.67 The problem is apparent from an earlier report showing a funding 
gap of over $1 billion in the European market.68 Coupled with the expense, 
developing a new drug is an incredibly risky financial undertaking. The 
percentage of drugs that make it to clinical trials is only about 30%, and 
only 0.02% of all drugs developed ever make it to market.69 Because it 
takes over a decade to begin to recoup such costs, biotech companies must 
rely heavily on patent certainty in the future.70 With less certainty of a 
return on investment comes a far more difficult time enticing venture 
capitalists to finance a new business.71 
E. Biotech Companies Provide a Valuable Service to the Public 
Beyond the mere financial benefit for biotech companies,72 the global 
public is profoundly dependent on biotech products. The world’s 
population is expanding, and new advances in genetically modified (GM) 
food will allow for more food growth using fewer resources.73 Humanity 
is experiencing the longest life expectancy in history, and it depends on 
new drugs to cure a variety of maladies from diabetes to arthritis to 
cancer.74 While weaker patent protection may seem beneficial because it 
                                                     
 65. Burrone, supra note 52. 
 66. This is evidenced by the massive surge in mergers and acquisitions (M&A) activity within 
the biotech industry in the last few years. In 2015 alone, over $300 billion worth of M&A activity was 
carried out in the pharmaceutical sector. See An All-Time Record Year for Pharma/Biotech M&A in 
2015, THEPHARMALETTER (July 1, 2016), https://www.thepharmaletter.com/article/an-all-time-
record-year-for-pharma-biotech-m-a [https://perma.cc/NAU6-8PU8]. 
 67. Sauer Testimony, supra note 55, at 4. 
 68. Burrone, supra note 52. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Obviously, it is also good for the economy to have profitable companies who are able to hire 
more employees. It is estimated that biotech companies spend over $20 billion on research alone, not 
to mention the jobs created in manufacturing, distribution, etc. See id. 
 73. See generally NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, THE USE OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED 
CROPS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2003), http://nuffieldbioethics.org/wp-content/uploads/GM-
Crops-Discussion-Paper-2003.pdf [https://perma.cc/UVD4-54VS] (highlighting the benefits of GM 
crops in growing more crops in harsher environments and using GM crops to alleviate nutritional 
deficiencies in developing countries). 
 74. Max Roser, Life Expectancy, OUR WORLD DATA, https://ourworldindata.org/lifeexpectancy/ 
[https://perma.cc/GY3F-WQPY]. 
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creates lower prices in the short-term, fewer venture capitalists would be 
willing to invest in innovative companies without the ability to recoup 
R&D expenses. 
III. IPRS SUBSTANTIALLY HARM BIOTECHNOLOGY INNOVATION 
AND GROWTH 
Inter partes and post-grant reviews were created for a worthy 
purpose: to decrease the cost and time involved in litigating against 
baseless patent trolls. Specifically, legislative history indicates that the 
intent was to prevent these baseless cases primarily in the technology 
sector.75 Whatever the original intent, it seems that the greatest harm from 
IPRs is being felt in the biopharmaceutical industry. 
The extent of IPR abuse has become so prevalent it was covered in 
the Wall Street Journal76 and is largely attributable to one company in 
particular.77 The technique of shorting a company’s stock and then filing 
an IPR is completely legal and available because of the lack of a standing 
requirement for an IPR; “a person who is not the owner of a patent may 
file with the Office a petition to institute an inter partes review of the 
patent.”78 In addition, the requirement to get an IPR instituted is a very low 
bar: a petitioner need only demonstrate a “reasonable likelihood” that it 
will prevail in showing at least one challenged claim to be unpatentable.79 
This has been construed to be low enough that the likelihood could be even 
less than a 50% chance of a claim being unpatentable.80 
Even without an IPR invalidating a patent, the mere filing of an IPR 
has been shown to have dramatic consequences. For example, when the 
Coalition for Affordable Drugs (CFAD) first filed an IPR against Acorda 
Therapeutics looking to invalidate its patent on Ampyra, a drug that 
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allowed multiple sclerosis patients greater mobility, the company’s stock 
prices dropped 9.7%.81 When the IPR was later instituted, the stock 
dropped an additional 7.8%.82 This stock drop was not due to a final 
decision or invalidation of a claim but simply from the PTAB instituting 
the hearing and looking into the allegations. Although no claims were 
invalidated, Acorda’s investors lost over $150 million in response to the 
IPR.83 
IV. A NOVEL APPROACH TO “FIXING” THE INTER PARTES REVIEW 
PROCEEDINGS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENTS BY A HYBRIDIZATION OF 
COVERED BUSINESS METHOD REVIEWS, OPPOSITIONS, 
AND COMMON SENSE 
Inter partes reviews were surely not meant to be abused for financial 
gain and were not designed to help invalidate otherwise valid patent 
claims. Unfortunately, this has been the result, and while there is 
consensus that the system is broken, there seems to be little consensus on 
how to fix it. A recent proposal raised in the House Judiciary Committee 
was designed to shield pharma patents from IPR review; however, it never 
made it out of committee.84 Other attempts have been made to contest the 
constitutionality of post-issuance reviews, though they too have been 
largely unsuccessful.85Although the Supreme Court has been deliberating 
the constitutionality of IPRs in the Oil States case, the consensus among 
patent professionals is that the Court will likely uphold IPRs as 
constitutional.86 Other legislative attempts have focused on amending 
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patent litigation laws, but because the issues arise during IPRs—not 
litigation—such reforms are unlikely to be of any help.87 
In light of the lack of solutions to the current problem, I endeavor to 
put forward a novel approach to improve IPRs by borrowing from other 
procedures in order to cure the most egregious defects of the IPR process: 
the standing requirement is too low, the amendment procedure is too 
draconian, and the claim interpretation is too biased towards the patent 
challenger. 
One of the greatest criticisms for IPRs is that, unlike cases in Article 
III courts, there is no standing requirement to initiate an IPR. Anyone who 
has unearthed allegedly invalidating prior art may file a review with the 
PTAB.88 Because the Supreme Court has largely avoided any challenges 
of IPRs on constitutional grounds,89 the duty to solve the standing issue 
must fall upon Congress. Abuse of IPRs in meritless cases can be 
addressed most simply by creating a requirement that those who intend to 
initiate an IPR must either be defendants in an infringement suit or must 
have been sent a cease-and-desist order by the patentee, similar to a CBM. 
This keeps the process of invalidating unworthy patents relatively 
inexpensive but assures that only parties with some legitimate interest in 
the validity of the patent can move forward with an IPR. 
Another harsh aspect of the current IPR proceedings is the difficulty 
of getting a challenged claim amended. Although statutes permit patentees 
to cancel a challenged claim and make a reasonable number of 
amendments,90 the amount of amendments that the PTAB has granted is 
incredibly low—around seven percent of amended claims have been 
allowed by the PTAB.91 In oppositions with the EPO, however, 
amendments are looked at more favorably, leading some companies to 
attempt amendments with the EPO in order to discern which amendments 
to bring with the PTAB.92 Compared to the “kill rate” of over seventy-five 
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percent of claims challenged in IPRs at the PTAB,93 seventy-one percent 
of opposition claims survived in either the original or amended form.94 
The major distinction between the two proceedings is who has the 
burden of showing the validity of amendments. In the United States, the 
patentee making the amended claims bears the burden of proving 
validity,95 whereas in Europe, the opposition has the burden of proving 
invalidity.96 The trade-off is that in oppositions there is no estoppel barring 
arguments that the challenger could have made in later challenges like 
there is in IPRs.97 In the interest of making amendments easier, it is 
reasonable to trade off the possibility of having to defend further actions 
in order to keep a claim from being invalidated, and it would go a long 
way in preventing the death of legitimate patents if instituted. 
The last amendment that should be made to biotech IPR proceedings, 
and really to every post-issuance challenge proceeding, is to have 
consistent claim interpretation for trials and post-issuance reviews. 
Though this viewpoint is neither novel nor unique, it is simply good 
common sense to give a patent that has been issued the presumption of 
validity.98 When the PTAB construes claim language, it gives the terms 
the “broadest reasonable construction.”99 However, in ordinary court 
proceedings, claim terms are given the “ordinary meaning . . . as 
understood by a person of skill in the art.”100 This discrepancy allows a 
much lower bar to invalidate patents at the PTAB than at trial because 
when terms are given a broader construction there is a greater chance that 
prior art will cover the claims, thus invalidating them. 
Most recently at the Supreme Court, Cuozzo argued that IPRs are 
meant to be “mini-trials” and should therefore use the same construction 
standard as at trial,101 but the Court ultimately rejected this argument 
claiming public policy concerns about stifling innovation.102 However, to 
promote innovation there has to be a reasonable assurance of a return on 
investment, and a presumption of validity creates a solid investment. 
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Making an IPR less of an unknown risk would make IPRs far less desirable 
to opportunists looking to bring meritless challenges without chilling 
parties looking to challenge truly suspect patents. 
CONCLUSION 
Post-issuance challenges such as inter partes review and post-grant 
reviews were created in response to a legitimate problem of patent trolls 
within the then-existing patent system. Unfortunately, by suppressing a 
problem in one area of technology, a new and significant problem has 
arisen in the biotech industry. By creating a system that makes it easier to 
invalidate a patent without any necessary standing, inter partes reviews 
have allowed uninterested third parties to throw legitimate companies with 
valid patents into chaos. Two of the most affected sectors from this abuse 
of power have been the pharmaceutical and biotech industries, and while 
it may seem to be advantageous to the public to have expensive drugs lose 
patent protection, the reality is that new innovations in pharmaceutical 
technology simply cannot happen if companies lose patent protection. 
The most vulnerable to IPR challenges are smaller biotech firms. 
These companies often have only one patented drug and limited resources 
with which to defend any patent challenges. After putting significant 
resources and time into developing a drug, making it past clinical trials, 
and being approved by the FDA, these companies have little to no capital 
left to defend any legal challenges and no safety net to stay viable while 
the Patent Trial and Appeals Board reviews the merits of the review 
process. If the future of pharmaceutical development depends on the 
continued existence of innovative small companies, the future is fragile 
indeed. 
Thus far, attempts to curb the abuse of IPRs have largely failed. The 
attempts to appeal to the courts have failed, and the legislature seems to 
be more concerned with the process of patent litigation than administrative 
proceedings. If the suggestions described above—including increasing the 
standing requirement for biotech patents to mirror that of covered business 
methods, loosening the restraints on claim amendments during reviews, 
and keeping claim construction consistent throughout reviews and 
litigation—are followed, the goal of efficiently invalidating abusive and 
meritless patents would still be achieved without collateral damage to the 
biotech industry. 
